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ACCESS TO TRIAL EXHIBI[TS IN CIVIL
SUITS: IN re REPORTERS COMMITTEE
FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
The first amendment to the Constitution provides that Con-
gress shall enact no law that abridges either freedom of speech or
freedom of the press.1 First amendment rights, however, often ex-
tend beyond those expressly enumerated in the Constitution and
encompass various interests through which the explicit constitu-
tional rights can be exercised.2 The Supreme Court has held that
these derivative interests provide the press and the public with a
presumptive right of access to criminal trials,3 which has created
an inference that this constitutional right should be extended to
encompass the civil arena as well. 4 Access to judicial proceedings
U.S. CONST. amend. I provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances.
Id.
, See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (right to receive
information); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (right to privacy); NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (right of association). Speaking for the Court in Gris-
wold, Justice Douglas wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance." 381
U.S. at 484.
See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980). The Court held
that "the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amend-
ment." Id., (footnote omitted).
4 See, e.g., id. at 599 (Stewart, J., concurring) (first amendment clearly gives press and
public right of access to civil trials); Fenner & Koley, Access to Judicial Proceedings: to
Richmond Newspapers and Beyond, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 430-32 (1981) (first
amendment right of access applies to civil as well as criminal trials); Constitutional
Law-First Amendment-Right of Access to Civil Trials: Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Co-
hen, 23 DUQ. L. REV. 1227, 1242 (1985) (right of access to civil trials should have constitu-
tional protection).
Commentators have examined the scope of the right of access to judicial proceedings by
examining the two considerations applied to define this right in Richmond Newspapers:
current and historical practice, and public policy. See Fenner & Koley, supra, at 428. Both
civil and criminal judicial proceedings have been described as historically open and public,
see id. at 431, and the public policy benefits of open civil trials have been viewed to be
similar to those in criminal proceedings. See id. at 432. Although the Richmond Newspapers
decision produced seven opinions, the positions of a majority of justices have been described
as supporting the extension of the right of access to civil proceedings. See id. at 430-31. But
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raises the issue of access to judicial records, including trial exhib-
its." Recently, however, in In re Reporters Committee for Free-
dom of the Press,6 the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit held that there is no constitutional right of
contemporaneous access to trial exhibits in civil trials.7
In Reporters Committee, the Reporters Committee for Free-
dom of the Press and four individual reporters (the reporters)
sought access to pretrial court records pertaining to a civil suit that
involved the president of Mobil Oil Corporation, his son, and the
Washington Post Company." The district court issued a protective
order surrounding the requested discovery documents,9 which were
cf. Bevier, Like Mackerel in the Moonlight: Some Reflections on Richmond Newspapers, 10
HOFSTRA L. REV. 311, 339-40 (1982) (arguing that reasoning of Justices in Richmond News-
papers gave rise to doctrinal confusion).
' See United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 819 (3d Cir. 1981). The Criden court dis-
cussed the presumptive common law right to inspect and copy judicial records, which is also
referred to as the right of access. Id. This right is derived from both "the public's right to
know, which encompasses public documents generally, and the public's right to open courts,
which has particular applicability to judicial records." Id. Trial exhibits, which may include
documents introduced into evidence, are part of the judicial record and are thus subject to
the public right of access. United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1259-60 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
Access to judicial records, including trial exhibits, is important because it protects the pub-
lic's right to monitor the functioning of the judicial system. See Wilson v. American Motors
Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1570 (11th Cir. 1985). Recently, first amendment protection has been
extended to the right of access to court documents. See In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 732
F.2d 1302, 1314 (7th Cir. 1984); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165,
1177 (6th Cir. 1983).
' 773 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
' Id. at 1339.
Id. at 1325-26. William Tavoulareas, the president of Mobil Oil Corp., and his son,
Peter, brought a libel suit against the Washington Post Co. (the Post) and several individu-
als connected with the Post. Id. They alleged that articles in The Washington Post sug-
gested that William Tavoulareas had used his influence to obtain for his son the position of
partner in a London shipping firm. Tavoulareas v. Piro, 93 F.R.D. 11, 13 (D.D.C. 1981).
They further alleged that the suggestion was false and that the defendants either knew this
or had reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement. Id. The plaintiffs also
sued Philip Piro, alleging that he made similar statements, again either with knowledge of
their falsity or with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity. Id.
1 Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1326. The motion for a protective order was made
pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c), which provides:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for
good cause shown, the court. . . may make any order which justice requires to
protect a party or persons from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense ....
Id. See generally C. WRIGHT. THE LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs § 83 (4th ed. 1983) (protective
orders provide remedies against abuse of discovery).
The district court outlined a procedure by which Mobil could note the confidentiality of
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filed to support cross-motions for summary judgment.10 The order
was based on the strength of a Mobil vice president's affidavit,
which generally described the negative effect that the documents'
release would have on the company.1" Mobil later requested an ex-
tension of the protective order to documents introduced at trial as
exhibits, and the district court granted the request without requir-
ing Mobil to provide further justification for confidentiality. 2 At
the conclusion of the trial,"3 Mobil waived most of its claims of
confidentiality, 14 and the district court ordered that the remaining
discovery documents and trial exhibits be unsealed.1 5
a document. Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1326. The Post would have an option to
challenge Mobil's designation, either through an accommodation or, if necessary, a court
ruling. Id. The Post opposed this procedure, arguing that it would be a prior restraint. Id.
See In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The court ruled, however, that the
order was a practical accommodation to the needs of the litigants. Tavoulareas v. Piro, 93
F.R.D. at 30.
'0 Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1326. The motions for summary judgment were
denied. Id.
11 Id. at 1326. The affidavit used to support the protective order claim generally stated
that release of the documents would harm Mobil's business in Saudi Arabia and its competi-
tive position in shipping. Id. It also stressed the impracticality of a one-by-one examination
of the documents. Id. The Post characterized the allegations in the affidavit as "wholly con-
clusory and overly general," Tavoulareas v. Piro, 93 F.R.D. 24, 29 (D.D.C. 1981), and argued
that the affidavit failed to describe any specific or identifiable harm that would result from
disclosure. Id. at 28. The court, however, ruled that the potential harm from disclosure of
the sensitive corporate documents was sufficient to warrant the protective order. Id. at 29.
12 Tavoulareas v. Piro, 93 F.R.D. at 29. The only portions of trial exhibits that were to
be made available to the press and public would be those portions read into evidence, or
used to question or impeach witnesses. Reporter's Committee, 773 F.2d at 1327. Mobil des-
ignated fifty-two trial exhibits as confidential. Id.
The court noted that the continued sealing was "essential to the efficient and expedi-
tious conduct of the trial." Id. (quoting Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., Civil Nos. 80-
3032 & 80-2387, slip op. at 4 (D.D.C. July 20, 1982)). The court agreed, however, to require
Mobil to explain its reasons for confidentiality after trial. Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at
1327.
" See Reporters Committee at 1327-28. After verdicts for William Tavoulareas against
the Post, for the Post against Peter Tavoulareas, and for William and Peter Tavoulareas
against Philip Piro, the trial court granted judgments notwithstanding the verdict to all
defendants. Id. In Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the judgments n.o.v., holding that the evidence
was sufficient to demonstrate that the article was published in reckless disregard for its
falsity. Id. at 137. Subsequently, the District of Columbia Circuit ordered a rehearing of the
cases en banc. Tavoulareas v. Piro, 763 F.2d 1472, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
14 Reporters Committee at 1328. Although Mobil originally designated fifty-two exhib-
its as confidential, after trial it only requested that eighteen remain protected. Id.
" Id. at 1328. Fourteen of the remaining trial exhibits were released because they ei-
ther had never been subject to the protective order or because they were already available to
the public. Id. Mobil waived its claim to three other exhibits, and the court unsealed the
final exhibit because the justification for confidentiality was unsatisfactory. Id.
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The reporters appealed the district court's order forbidding
the disclosure of both pretrial discovery documents, and docu-
ments introduced as trial exhibits. 16 The court of appeals, after
dealing with the threshold questions of mootness 17 and finality, 8
held that the district court could constitutionally refuse access to
these materials until it issued a final judgment. 9
Judge Scalia, writing for the majority, analyzed the protective
order by questioning whether court records historically had been
open, and whether access to court records played an essential role
in the judicial process.20 Although recognizing a tradition of condi-
tional public access to such records,21 the Reporters Committee
court held that the right did not apply "until trial or judgment,"22
Is Id.
17 Id. at 1328-30. Federal courts are limited to deciding cases or controversies. U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. If a dispute is resolved, there is no longer a case or controversy. C.
WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 55. In Reporters Committee, the documents in issue were released
after trial. Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1328. The court, however, decided the case
because the event fell into the category of things "capable of repetition, yet evading review."
Id. at 1328. (citation omitted) Under this doctrine, an otherwise moot claim can be brought
if it was of too short a duration to be fully litigated before it became moot and if there is a
reasonable expectation of another occurrence of the underlying event to the same party. C.
WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 55; see, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546-47
(1976) (restrictive order in completed murder trial could be imposed in second trial or in
other trials). See generally J. NowAv, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 64-67
(2d ed. 1983) (orders that normally expire before review becomes available excepted from
general rule against deciding moot questions).
18 Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1330. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982), "[t]he courts
of appeals. . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts
of the United States. . . ." Id. The rule barring review of non final decisions is generally
followed, so that delay of litigation due to interlocutory appeals can be avoided. See C.
WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 697-98. However, in some cases a court may review a "collateral
order." Id. at 701. To be reviewable, "the order must conclusively determine the disputed
question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and
be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v. Live-
say, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978) (citation omitted). In Reporters Committee, the court held
that the reporters' claim was reviewable because it was separate from, and collateral to, the
merits of the underlying case. Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1330.
,9 Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1339.
20 Id. at 1331-32. The court drew from the analysis of the constitutional right of access
as it related to criminal trials in three previous Supreme Court cases. Id.; see Press-Enter-
prise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 507-511 (1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605-06 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
569-73 (1980).
21 Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1333.
22 Id. at 1336. The court put strong emphasis on two late nineteenth-century cases,
Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392 (1884), Schmedding v. May, 85 Mich. 1, 48 N.W. 201
(1891), as support for the proposition that there was "no right of public access to pre-judg-
ment records in civil cases." Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1334. In his dissent, however,
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at which time any policy considerations favoring an open trial
would be satisfied.23
Judge Wright, dissenting in part,24 contended that federal
common law created a rebuttable presumption of contemporaneous
access to designated trial exhibits.2 5 To overcome this presump-
tion, Judge Wright stated, Mobil should have been required to jus-
tify its request for a provisional seal for each document on an indi-
vidual basis .2  The dissent concluded by stating that a
constitutional right of access was supported both historically27 and
by reasons of public policy.28 Therefore, Judge Wright would have
Judge Wright argued that both Schmedding and Cowley dealt with a claim of access before
trial, not before judgment. Id. at 1349-50 & n.17 (Wright, J., concurring and dissenting); see
Cowley, 137 Mass. at 395; Schmedding, 85 Mich. at 2, 48 N.W. at 202; Cowley, 137 Mass. at
395.
22 Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1336-37. The court stated that access to civil trials
is rarely requested and that a denial of access rarely results in public outcry. Id.
24 Id. at 1341 (Wright, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Wright concurred with the
majority's holding that the reporters had no right of access to pretrial materials. Id.
(Wright, J., concurring and dissenting). (the issue of access to pretrial discovery documents
is beyond the scope of this Comment. Some federal courts have extended a right of access to
pretrial exhibits in criminal cases. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States Dist. Court,
705 F.2d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 1983) (closure order without showing of potential harm
violated first amendment right); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods.
Antitrust Litig., 101 F.R.D. 34, 43 & n.9 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (pretrial briefs and summary judg-
ment documents presumptively open under common law); see also Note, Access to Pretrial
Documents Under the First Amendment, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1813, 1851 (1984) (arguing for
access to pretrial documents).
25 Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1345 (Wright, J., concurring and dissenting).
Judge Wright considered timely access to trial documents necessary for "public understand-
ing of judicial decisionmaking." Id. at 1342. The dissent cited several federal and state cases
supporting the conditional common law right of access before judgment. Id. at 1342-43
(Wright, J., concurring and dissenting); see also In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d
1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984) ("long-recognized presumption in favor of public access to judicial
records"); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177 (6th Cir. 1983)
(open courtroom fundamental to American judicial system), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100
(1984); State ex rel. Gore Newspapers Co. v. Tyson, 313 So. 2d 777, 784 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (public has conditional right of access in divorce proceedings).
11 Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1345-46 (Wright, J., concurring and dissenting).
27 Id. at 1348-51 (Wright, J., concurring and dissenting). The dissent argued that the
right of access to trial exhibits arose when the exhibits were introduced at trial, countering
the majority's contention that the right did not attach before judgment. Id. at 1348 (Wright,
J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Wright distinguished the support cited by the majority
as caselaw dealing with access to pretrial documents rather than not trial exhibits. Id. at
1348-49 (Wright, J., concurring and dissenting); see supra note 22.
21 Id. at 1351-53 (Wright, J., concurring and dissenting). The dissent discussed the im-
portant functions that open trials serve, including facilitating fact finding, fairness, and le-
gitimacy in judicial proceedings. Id. at 1351 (Wright, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge
Wright also stressed the important public interest in contemporaneous access, rather than
access to a transcript after judgment. Id. at 1352-53 (Wright, J., concurring and dissenting).
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reversed the district court's decision to extend the terms of its pro-
tective order to the documents used as trial exhibits.29
The Reporters Committee decision conflicts with decisions in
several other circuits recognizing a constitutional right of access to
civil trials.30 It is submitted that federal common law and the first
amendment grant the press and public a presumptive right of ac-
cess to civil trials and to civil trial exhibits. It is further submitted
that in Reporters Committee, the extension of the provisional seal
was justified and the reporters were properly heard on the issue of
access. This Comment will address the common law and constitu-
tional rights of access, and will conclude by proposing a standard
for the application of these rights.
THE COMMON LAW RIGHT OF ACCESS
Federal courts have consistently recognized a presumptive
common law right of access to judicial proceedings and records.31
He reasoned that the danger was not the possibility of distortion, but rather, the suppres-
sion of information through delay. Id. at 1353 (Wright, J., concurring and dissenting).
29 Id. at 1346, 1356 (Wright, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Wright proposed two
requirements for the granting of a provisional seal: the presence of a substantial government
interest, and the absence of a less restrictive remedy. Id. at 1354 (Wright, J., concurring and
dissenting). Judge Wright stated that the need to avoid undue delay in litigation could be a
sufficient reason for the imposition of a provisional seal under this analysis. Id. at 1335.
(Wright, J., concurring and dissenting). He added, however, that the requirement of a less
restrictive means analysis would guard against the use of delay as an excuse for imposing a
provisional seal at any time. Id. (Wright, J., concurring and dissenting).
20 See, e.g., Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984) (recognizing
conditional first amendment right of access); In re Iowa Freedom of Information Council,
724 F.2d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 1983) (applying first amendment right of access to partly civil
and partly criminal contempt hearing); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710
F.2d 1165, 1178 (6th Cir. 1983) (Supreme Court an"alysis of first amendment access to crimi-
nal trials applies to civil trials), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984).
In Pubiicker, the trial court closed hearings on motions for a preliminary injunction
because of the confidential information involved. 773 F.2d at 1062-63. Portions of the tran-
scripts of the hearing were sealed without explanation. Id. at 1064. The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit held that the press and the public possess a presumptive right of access to
civil proceedings, based upon common law and the first amendment. Id. at 1071. The court
reversed the trial court's ruling on the grounds that the closure order had been too broad in
scope and that the sealing of the transcripts had been done without an articulation of find-
ings. Id. at 1074.
1 See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978); In re Conti-
nental Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984); Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark,
654 F.2d 423, 429 (5th Cir. 1981). In Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir.
1984), the court wrote that "[t]he existence of a common law right of access to judicial
proceedings and to inspect judicial records is beyond dispute." Id. at 1066. The common law
right is not absolute, but it has been described as being important to the preservation of
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This right extends to documents introduced as trial exhibits be-
cause the documents become part of the judicial record.3 2 Although
the Reporters Committee majority recognized a "tradition of pub-
lic access,"'3 it refused to rest its decision on federal common law34
and instead examined the traditional right of access solely through
analysis of the first amendment.3 5
The common law right of access to trials and trial exhibits is
conditional.3 6 If the content of the information sought is claimed to
be confidential, sensitive, or privileged, a court may be justified in
restricting access to the trial or to court records.3 7 In this manner,
integrity of law enforcement and the judicial processes. United States v. Hickey, 767 F.2d
705, 708 (10th Cir. 1985).
32 See United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1259-60 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
33 In re Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1333 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
31 Id. at 1340 (Wright, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Wright argued that the
case should have been disposed of through a reliance on federal common law, without reach-
ing the constitutional question. Id. Concurring in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936),
Justice Brandeis wrote that if a court could decide a case on both constitutional grounds
and general law, it should rely on general law. Id. at 347 (Brandeis, J., concurring). This
policy is followed because of the serious consequences that may result from unnecessary
resolution of constitutional questions. See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549,
571-72 (1947).
The Reporters Committee majority, however, stressed that only the constitutional issue
was raised, presumably because the appellants believed that federal common law would not
support their position. Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1330. Other federal courts that
have decided the issue of access have also addressed the first amendment question. See, e.g.,
Publicker Indus. Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067 (3d Cir. 1984). Judge Wright would have
required the parties to submit supplemental briefs on the common law issue. Reporters
Committee, 773 F.2d at 1342 (Wright, J., concurring and dissenting).
35 Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1332-36.
36 See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978) ("right to in-
spect and copy judicial records is not absolute"); In re Caswell, 18 R.I. 835, 835, 29 A. 259,
259 (1893) (cannot exercise right out of curiosity or to create scandal); see also Note, supra
note 24, at 1825-26 (presumption of openness tempered by discretion of trial judge and facts
of case).
37 See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714-16 (1974) (recognizing confiden-
tial nature of Presidential communication); In re Iowa Freedom of Information Council, 724
F.2d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 1983) (substantial damage to property rights in trade secrets justified
closure); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 907 (E.D. Pa.
1981) (sensitive commercial information was sufficient for sealing of documents).
The conflicting interests that may be sufficient to rebut the conditional right of access
include protection of national security, trade secrets, juveniles, and privacy. Comment, The
First Amendment Right of Access to Civil Trials After Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 51 U. CH. L. REV. 286, 299-313 (1984). The interests of the public in fair trials and
informed debate must be balanced against the interests of litigants in a fair trial, privacy,
and secrecy. Note, After Richmond Newspapers: A Public Right to Attend Civil Trials?, 4
COMM/ENT L.J. 291, 300-15 (1982).
TRIAL EXHIBITS
the proponents of the provisional seal in Reporters Committee
claimed that confidentiality was necessary to protect their com-
mercial interests.38 Thus, the decision as to whether a claim is suf-
ficient to rebut the presumptive common law right of access is a
matter of judicial discretion, subject to appellate review for
abuse.39
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE
Rather than rely on common law, however, the appellants in
Reporters Committee raised the constitutional issue of whether
the first amendment gave the press and the public a right of access
to civil trials and a right to inspect and copy judicial records.40 In
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,41 the Supreme Court held
that "the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guaran-
tees of the First Amendment. ' '42 The Court ruled that a criminal
trial must be open unless the trial court could articulate an over-
riding interest in secrecy.43 The determination of whether a consti-
tutional right of access applied to civil trials and trial exhibits
would be guided by the two factors that the Richmond Newspa-
pers plurality examined:44 whether access was historically rooted
and whether it played an important role in the judicial process. 5
Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1326; see supra note 11.
United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589 (1978). For a general
discussion of judicial discretion, see Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court,
Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 635, 636-650 (1971).
10 Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1330. See supra note 34.
41 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
42 Id. at 580. The defendant in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555
(1980), had been convicted of murdering a hotel manager. Id. at 559. The conviction was
reversed and the second trial ended in a mistrial. Id. The third trial also ended in a mistrial,
possibly because the jurors had learned of the previous trials. Id. At the fourth trial, the
defendant asked that the trial be closed to the public, and the prosecutor did not object to
the motion. Id. at 559-60. The trial judge granted the request, relying on VA. CODE § 19.2-
266 (Supp. 1980), which allows trial courts discretion to close trials. Richmond Newspapers,
448 U.S. at 560. Richmond Newspapers sought a hearing on a motion to vacate the order.
Id. The court denied the motion to vacate, and the trial was closed to the press and to the
public. Id. at 561.
'- Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580-81.
44 See, e.g., Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067-68 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying
Richmond Newspapers analysis to issue of access to civil trials); Brown & Williamson To-
bacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177-79 (6th Cir. 1983) (historical and philosophical
analysis of right of access in civil trials); Fenner & Koley, supra note 4, at 430 (Richmond
Newspapers analysis supports extension of right to civil trials).
4" Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564-69. The plurality opinion traced the historic
19861
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In Richmond Newspapers, the Court noted that historically,
civil and criminal trials always had been presumptively open.46 At
common law in England, all judicial trials were held in open
court.47 Later, in eighteenth-century America, some colonies specif-
ically required open civil trials.48 As modern case law developed,
courts adhered to this historic tradition of access.4" A right of ac-
cess to trial exhibits would attach when the exhibits are introduced
at trial, because that is when they become part of the trial.50
Under the Richmond Newspapers analysis, however, access to
trials and judicial records can be barred if it is not vital to the
judicial process.5 1 Although Richmond Newspapers involved a
criminal trial, this threshold can be met in civil actions as well,
openness of criminal trials at common law in England, id. at 565-67, and illustrated the
historic evidence of the open criminal trial in colonial America. Id. at 567-69. The Court also
described presumptive openness as "an indispensible attribute of an Anglo-American trial."
Id. at 569. The Court cited the need for public acceptance of the process of justice and its
results. Id. at 571. Open criminal trials, the Court wrote, serve a "community therapeutic
value" by providing an outlet for the feelings of emotion and protest. Id. at 570-71. In addi-
tion, they provide an appearance of justice and an education for the public. Id. at 571-72.
These needs are satisfied by open criminal trials, the Court wrote, because "[p]eople in an
open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to
accept what they are prohibited from observing." Id. at 572.
16 Id. at 580 n.17.
'1 See Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1069 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting E. JENCKS,
THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 73-74 (6th ed. 1967)); A. KIRALFY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM
247 (4th ed. 1967).
4" See 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 129, 271 (1971).
West New Jersey and Pennsylvania both required open courts, civil and criminal. Id. Other
colonies, however, specified open trials only in criminal cases. Id. at 323-24, 371-72. How-
ever, these colonies may have been protecting the rights of the accused rather than freedom
of speech and of the press. Cf. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 385-86 (1979) (sixth
amendment gives accused right to demand public trial).
" See, e.g., Wilson v. American Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1570 (11th Cir. 1985)
(recognition of common law right of access); Nowack v. Fuller, 243 Mich. 200, 201, 219 N.W.
749, 750 (1928) (right was based on interest of citizen in the record); In re Caswell, 18 R.I.
835, 835, 29 A. 259, 259 (1893) (right applies to one who acts as representative of public).
50 See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 394-97 (1979) (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring). Chief Justice Burger distinguished between a trial and a pretrial hearing, suggesting
that the timing of a proceeding would be significant in determining public access. Id. at 394-
95 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice stated that pretrial materials would be sub-
ject to publicity when they became part of the trial, i.e., the time at which they are offered
into evidence. Id. at 396 (Burger, C.J., concurring); see also In re Coordinated Pretrial Pro-
ceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 101 F.R.D. 34, 43 n.9 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (com-
mon law right of access attached to pretrial briefs and summary judgment materials when
submitted to court); Comment, All Courts Shall Be Open: The Public's Right to View Judi-
cial Proceedings and Records, 52 TEMPLE L. REv. 311, 337-38 (1979) (right of access to judi-
cial records is coextensive with right to public trial).
"' Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569-73 (1980); see supra notes 45 & 46.
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because many civil trials involve issues that are as important to the
public as those in criminal cases.52 When civil trials involve serious
social and economic issues, public access is a necessary precondi-
tion to public confidence in the administration of justice.53 Indeed,
public access to civil trials and to judicial records has been de-
scribed as "fundamental to a democratic state, '54 serving as both a
check on public officials, and as a means of aiding the efficient ad-
ministration of justice." Although the press has no greater right of
access than the public generally, 56 the press serves as the dissemi-
nator of information through which the public can judge the
proper functioning of the courts.57 Because civil trials were histori-
52 See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 386-87 n.15 (1979). The Gannett Court
noted that the public interest in access to judicial proceedings may be stronger in a civil
case than in a criminal case, citing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)
which decided that black slaves were not citizens, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954), which held that racial segregation in schools was a denial of equal protection, and
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), which examined racial quotas and
affirmative action programs. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 386-87 n.15.
Although the issue of public access to trials has been addressed by the Supreme Court
only in criminal cases, policy justifications for access to criminal trials apply to civil trials as
well. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984). In Brown & Williamson, the court noted that because civil
litigation often affects third parties and the general public, public access serves as a check
on judicial administration, and aids in accurate fact-finding. See Id.; see also United States
v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 862 (3d Cir. 1978) (Gibbons, J., concurring) (political issues de-
cided in civil cases may have greater impact than legislation).
" See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 893 (2d Cir. 1982)(court should consider public
confidence in shareholder derivative suit), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983). In Joy, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed the danger of routinely dismissing share-
holders derivative suits on the basis of secret documents. Id. The court stressed the need for
shareholders to have confidence that their interests were being protected and recommended
a balancing of these interests before imposing a seal. Id.
54 United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
" See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 592-97 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring). With regard to criminal trials, Justice Brennan stated that public access was
one of the "checks and balances" on judicial abuse. Id. at 596 (Brennan, J., concurring). He
observed that open trials also have a "structural significance" in assuring fair adjudication,
id. at 593-94 (Brennan, J., concurring), making access "an indispensible element of the trial
process itself." Id. at 597 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178 (6th Cir. 1983) (public scrutiny and discussion forces
judges to be responsible for rulings), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1100 (1984); Cowley v. Pulsifer,
137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884) (those administering justice must act under public eye and sense
of public responsibility).
" Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972).
57 See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). The press plays a
special role in conveying information to the public regarding the functioning of the courts.
See Comment, supra note 37, at 347. It educates the public about judicial proceedings and
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cally open and because they possess an essential role in the judicial
process, it is submitted that the press and the public enjoy a pre-
sumptive right of access to civil trials and trial exhibits, a right
guaranteed by the first amendment.
A PROCEDURAL STANDARD
Both the common law and the constitutional right of access
are conditional; thus, a trial court may close judicial proceedings or
seal judicial records if there is sufficient justification.58 Under com-
mon law, the decision to permit access is within the discretion of
the trial court.59 To safeguard the first amendment right of access
of the public and the press, however, this discretionary decision
should be guided by substantive and procedural standards.6 0
The Supreme Court has set forth a substantive rule for the
closing of criminal trials in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court." The Court stated that denial of access to a criminal trial
must be "necessitated by a compelling governmental interest"6 2
serves as a "watchdog of the courts." Id.
In a 1979 address, Justice Brennan remarked that "the First Amendment protects the
structure of communications necessary for the existence of our democracy." Address by Wil-
liam J. Brennan, Jr., 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173, 176 (1979). Justice Brennan would extend
"unique First Amendment protection" to the press when it performs those activities in-
volved in gathering and disseminating the news. Id. at 177. Justice Brennan also expressed
this view in his concurring opinion in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555
(1980), when he wrote that "the First Amendment ...has a structural role to play in
securing and fostering our republican system of self-government," id. at 587 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (emphasis original).
58 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
"9 United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978). See supra
note 39.
60 See Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1984); see also Note,
Procedural and Substantive Prerequisites to Restricting the First Amendment Right of
Access to Civil Hearings and Transcripts, 58 TEMp. L. Q. 159, 169 (1985) (courts beginning
to determine substantive justifications and procedural rules for restrictions on access).
6' 457 U.S. 596 (1982). Globe involved a Massachusetts statute that mandated closure
of a trial during the testimony of a minor sex-offense victim. Id. at 598. The Court held that
a statute could not constitutionally mandate closure, although the interests in a specific case
might be sufficient to require closure. Id. at 607-08.
62 Id. at 607. Several courts have used language similar to that of Globe in defining the
governmental interest that may overcome the presumption of access. See, e.g., Wilson v.
American Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1570 (11th Cir. 1985) ("exceptional circumstances");
Publicker Indus. Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1073 (3d Cir. 1984) (important "counter-
vailing interest"); In re Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 635 F.2d 945, 952 (2d Cir. 1980) ("most
extraordinary circumstances"). In his dissent in Reporters Committee, Judge Wright noted
that the standard may not be as strict in a civil trial as in a criminal trial. In re Reporters
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and "narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 6 3 Similarly, in a civil
trial, a court should balance the interests of the parties to decide
whether the right of access is paramount or whether it has been
overcome by a substantial, narrowly drawn governmental
interest.6 4
Because it is difficult to define situations in which substantial
interests would necessitate the closing of a trial or the sealing of
records, the balancing process is necessarily discretionary.65 To
provide an appellate court with an adequate basis for review, how-
ever, a trial court should demonstrate the reasons for its decision
with specificity.6 6 In addition, the trial court should consider all
Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Wright, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
63 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982). Courts recognizing
a first amendment right of access have required that any limitation on access be the least
restrictive way to advance the governmental interest being protected. See Publicker Indus.
Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1073 (3d Cir. 1984); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984). To the extent
that public interest in access and the private interest in nondisclosure are both strong, a
court might satisfy both interests through partial or redacted disclosure of trial exhibit doc-
uments. See, e.g., United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 324-325 (D.C. Cir. 1980)(trial
court may permit partial disclosure of documents).
See In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1313-16 (7th Cir. 1984). In Con-
tinental Illinois, a report on litigation of derivative claims was admitted into evidence, id. at
1304-05, and the trial judge ordered the report to be open. Id. at 1306-07. The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a presumption of access applied to the report,
which was used in connection with a motion to terminate. Id. at 1309. The court balanced
the interests of the public in understanding disputes and assuring a fair judicial system, id.
at 1314, with the attorney-client privilege and need for confidentiality. Id. The court found
that the private interests did not outweigh the right of access, especially since parts of the
report were admitted into evidence. Id. at 1314-16. See generally Emerson, First Amend-
ment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALiF. L. R-v. 422, 446-54 (1980) (examining how
Burger Court balances first amendment protections).
65 United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589 (1978). The decision of a
trial court to close a trial or seal records would be subject to review only for abuse of discre-
tion. See id.; supra note 39.
66 See Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1073 (3d Cir. 1984). In Publicker, the
court held that the trial court had abused its discretion by issuing an order of confidential-
ity without explaining its rationale. Id. The court refused to speculate regarding whether the
rationale of the trial court was correct. Id. The court stressed that the record did not "pro-
vide a firm base for an appellate judgment that discretion was soundly exercised." Id. (quot-
ing United-States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 819 (3d Cir. 1981)). The decision in Richmond
Newspapers also supports the requirement of articulated findings. See Richmond Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980); but see In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 732
F.2d 1302, 1313 (7th Cir. 1984). The Continental Illinois court held that appellate review
was not precluded by a failure of the trial court to articulate findings. Id. The court sug-
gested, however, that express findings would be desirable in the future. Id.
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alternatives, so that any denial of access is "narrowly tailored. '67
Finally, third parties should have an opportunity to be heard so
that they may challenge any denial of access. 8
In Reporters Committee, the trial court extended the pretrial
protective order to documents used as trial exhibits without re-
quiring further justification.69 The restriction was narrow because
portions of protected documents that were used to question or im-
peach witnesses, or read into evidence, were made available to the
press and the public in the transcript.70 The reporters were given a
hearing, but the district court found the sealing of these docu-
ments to be "essential to the efficient and expeditious conduct of
the trial."7 1 It is submitted that although the court of appeals
should have recognized the common law and constitutional right of
access, the trial court's extension of the pretrial protective order to
trial exhibits was a narrow accommodation of the needs of the liti-
gation and did not unduly infringe upon the public access rights of
the reporters.
CONCLUSION
Civil trials involve issues that may profoundly affect the gen-
eral public. Courts should recognize that the public and the press
have a presumptive right of access to civil trials and to civil trial
exhibits, a right derived from both federal common law and the
first amendment. While a narrowly tailored, substantial interest
may overcome these rights, a trial court must consider the compet-
67 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982). In Press-Enter-
prise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984), an order closing a voir dire proceeding was
vacated because the trial judge failed to articulate findings. Id. at 513; see also Publicker
Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1074 (3d Cir. 1984) (trial court failed to consider less restric-
tive alternative of bifurcated hearing before closure).
"8 Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 401 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). Justice
Powell wrote that "[i]f the constitutional right of the press and public to access is to have
substance, representatives of these groups must be given an opportunity to be heard on the
question of their exclusion." Id. at 401 (Powell, J., concurring); see also United States v.
Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1173 (9th Cir. 1982) (newspaper had right to be heard before ex-
clusion in criminal trial).
9 In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1326 (D.C. Cir.
1985); see supra notes 11 & 12. The order was subject to the original pretrial limitations,
including the litigants' option to challenge confidentiality designations. Reporters Commit-
tee, 773 F.2d at 1326; see supra note 9.
70 Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d at 1326-27.
71 Id. at 1327 (quoting Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., Nos. 80-3032 & 80-2387,
slip op. at 4 (D.D.C. July 20, 1982)).
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ing interests with reasoned discretion. In this way, the courts will
safeguard the rights of litigants and the public.
Kevin J. Mulry
